Brute Facts Are Mute Facts: A Van Tilian Transcendental Argument

Recent discussions on the Internet have led me to believe that there is a need to write this post. Here I will be clarifying, formalizing, and defending an argument which I believe is central to Van Til’s thought. To my knowledge, there is no such clarification and formalization of the argument available and so in writing this article, I hope to bring something fresh to the Van Tilian’s arsenal of arguments.

Van Til’s Doctrine of Analogy

Central to Van Til’s thought is the doctrine of analogy. Van Til made a distinction between reasoning that is univocal and reasoning which is analogical. Greg Bahnsen describes univocal reasoning in this way:

“Univocal” reasoning does not honor the Creator-creature distinction, but assumes that God and man approach knowing in the same way and under essentially the same conditions. It refuses to “think God’s thoughts after Him” (cf. chap. 4.5 above) and asserts its intellectual autonomy.1

However, for Van Til, human knowledge must be analogical. That is, God’s knowledge is original and man’s knowledge is derivative of God’s original knowledge.

All his [man's] knowledge is analogical of God. God is the original knower and man is the derivative re-knower. Man knows in subordination to God; he knows as the covenant-keeper.2

This doctrine of analogy is central to Van Til’s revelational epistemology and he believed that for man to know anything at all, his knowledge must be analogical. That is, univocal or autonomous reasoning rendered human knowledge and predication impossible. But what argument can be provided for this claim? How can we demonstrate that analogical reasoning is necessary for human knowledge? I believe there is an argument that can be found in various areas of Van Til’s thought. It is this argument that I will be clarifying and formalizing in this post. In order to make the argument clear, we would have to first examine Van Til’s understanding of facts and their relation to God.

A Christian Philosophy of Fact

Van Til taught, in accordance with Scripture, that all facts are created facts. For Van Til, it is God’s act of creation that makes the facts what they are. God has a comprehensive plan for history and this plan has existed for all eternity. It is this comprehensive plan that makes the facts what they are because God instantiates every event and fact of history according to this preconceived eternal plan. Van Til writes:

God knows or interprets the facts before they are facts. It is God’s plan, God’s comprehensive interpretation of the facts that makes the facts what they are.3

He also writes:

The necessity of reasoning analogically is always implied in the theistic conception of God. If God is to be thought of at all as necessary for man's interpretation of the facts or objects of knowledge, he must be thought of as being determinative of the objects of knowledge. In other words, he must then be thought of as the only ultimate interpreter, and man must be thought of as a finite reinterpreter. Since, then, the absolute self-consciousness of God is the final interpreter of all facts, man's knowledge is analogical of God's knowledge. Since all the finite facts exist by virtue of the interpretation of God, man's interpretation of the finite facts is ultimately dependent upon God's interpretation of the facts. Man cannot, except to his own hurt, look at the facts without looking at God's interpretation of the facts. Man's knowledge of the facts is then a reinterpretation of God's interpretation. It is this that is meant by saying that man's knowledge is analogical of God’s knowledge.4

Here we see that God’s plan and interpretation precedes the facts. God’s plan and interpretation are “back of” the facts, giving them meaning prior to their instantiation or man’s experience of them. We can say, then, that given Christian Theism, there is a comprehensive pre-interpretation of all facts. The facts that man experiences are exhaustively interpreted, given meaning, rationalized, and organized into a system. This interpretation is prior to both the instantiation of the facts in history and to man’s experience of them. Van Til maintains that God "must be taken as the prerequisite of the possibility and actuality of relationship between man's various concepts and propositions of knowledge. Man's system of knowledge must therefore be an analogical replica of the system of knowledge which belongs to God”5. That is, whatever relationship that exists between the facts and concepts which man utilizes, it exists in virtue of God’s plan and interpretation of facts. Van Til’s doctrine of analogy, then, is simply a consequence of this Christian philosophy of fact. Because the facts have been authoritatively and comprehensively interpreted by God, in order to have knowledge of facts, man must seek to mirror the system in God’s mind. Since God’s interpretation is constructive of the world of facts, man must consult that interpretation in order to properly interpret the facts. Reasoning analogically is a necessary consequence of the Christian philosophy of fact. Also, a Christian philosophy of fact is involved in the doctrine of analogy. The two views are interconnected — they rise and fall together.

Stating the Argument

What happens if we reject the doctrine of analogy described above? It follows that there ceases to be a comprehensive pre-interpretation of all facts. To reject analogical reasoning is simply to say that man is the original interpreter of the facts and that he need not consult any prior interpretation in order to know the facts. If the Christian philosophy of fact is true, then man must reason analogically for it can be no other way. However, if univocal reasoning is in fact possible, then it means the Christian philosophy of fact is false. At this juncture, we can state our first premise:

1. If analogical reasoning is not the case, then there is no comprehensive pre-interpretation of all facts

This follows from the preceding discussion of the Christian philosophy of fact and the doctrine of analogy. It is not possible for there to be a comprehensive pre-interpretation of all facts and the doctrine of analogy be false. 

What consequences arise from a denial of a comprehensive pre-interpretation of all facts? There are two implications of a denial of the Christian philosophy of fact. The first is that the facts become wholly discrete and unrelated to each other. The second is that man’s interpretation of the facts becomes original. Hence, we can state our second premise thusly:

2. If there is no comprehensive pre-interpretation of all facts, then (a) the facts are brute facts, and (b) man’s interpretation is wholly original

This premise is definitely controversial and hence would require some defense. What is a “brute” fact and how is it a consequence of univocal reasoning? Simply speaking, a “brute” fact is a fact without explanation, rationale, or interpretation. A brute fact is a fact that just is — it is the way it is solely as a result of “Chance”. We should recall that according to Christian Theism, God exhaustively orders and interprets every fact. God establishes every relation that exists between facts by interpreting and organizing them into a system. What should be noted is that if such a view is rejected, and there is no comprehensive pre-interpretation of the facts, then the facts cease to be eternally related or systematized. The facts cease to be related to each other prior to their instantiation. Every fact, then, in effect, becomes a “brute” fact—there is no order, rationale or interpretation preceding them. Prior to man’s experience of them, the facts have no order or relation. Every fact, then, becomes wholly new, individual, and discrete.

Furthermore, if we reject a comprehensive pre-interpretation of all facts, it follows that man must be the first to interpret and give order to the facts. This is a direct consequence of a rejection of the doctrine of analogy. Since God is not the first and original interpreter of the facts, man must take His place. Man, in order to know the facts, must organize and relate them into a system independently. If we reject analogical reasoning, then man must take up the task of rationalizing the brute facts which he experiences.

We can consider our second premise adequately defended. However, we have not yet reached our conclusion. We have not yet demonstrated that knowledge is impossible on a univocal basis. What we have shown is that a rejection of analogical reasoning leads to an acceptance of brute facts and an acceptance of the originality of man’s interpretation of facts. There are problematic implications for such acceptances, however.  It is our contention that brute facts are unintelligible and unknowable. As such if univocal reasoning results in an acceptance of brute facts, then univocal reasoning results in a denial of human knowledge. Also, we contend that if man’s interpretation is original, the resultant subjectivism leads to the impossibility of knowledge as well. We can add two premises to our argument:

3. If (a), then skepticism results and knowledge is impossible 

4. If (b), then subjectivism results and knowledge is impossible.

The above premises are equally controversial so we would have to defend them. Premise (3) is true because brute facts are unintelligible and unknowable. But what reason do we have for accepting this?

Brute facts, by their very nature, are wholly discrete and unrelated to other facts. However, if the facts are discrete and unrelated, then predication about such facts would be impossible. Predication, and by extension knowing, requires unity between facts such that they can be related in terms of general principles and classes. No fact can be known in isolation. A fact that cannot be put in relation with other facts would be unintelligible. Our understanding of facts is based upon our ability to relate them to other facts, concepts, and systems. Bahnsen puts the point well:

If the “facts” (external events or states of affairs) are completely a matter of “chance”—random and unconnected, having no rationale, no preestablished order, no intended pattern or preceding interpretation, no necessity—then they are indeed “brute” or untamed, not subject to reason. In that case, speaking of something (e.g., “the horse”) as an instance of a class wherein members are connected or part of a definable order, and speaking of its relations or properties (“is a gray mare”) in general terms that are applicable to other particular things, would be contrary to the isolated and brute character of chance facts. Brute facts would have to be mute—that is, not subject to predication or communication.6

Brute facts are mute facts. They cannot be predicated about or organized into a coherent system of knowledge. Any organization, systematization, or interpretation of brute facts would be contrary to the brute and discrete character of the facts. Hence, if the facts are brute, they are unintelligible and unknowable. Our third premise is defended.

The above consideration implies that if man’s interpretation is original he is, in essence, attempting to do the impossible — rationalizing the irrational. In order to know the facts, the autonomous thinker must provide a system and a structure to the facts. However, since the facts are brute, such a structuring is in principle impossible. The best the autonomous thinker can do is arbitrarily impose his categories of interpretation upon brute and irrational facts. In that case, the order and structure which he observes in the facts does not come from the facts themselves but from the activity of his own mind. Hence, he knows only his own mind and not the facts as they are. Subjectivism ensues. If man’s interpretation is original, then his knowledge is subjective. However, subjective knowledge is an oxymoron. James Douglas Baird summarizes the situation perfectly:

For the post-Kant philosopher, the human mind must be singularly able to discover facts and autonomously legislate the relationship between facts by use of the a priori faculty of reason. As Van Til here emphasizes, the modern man understands the world of facts to be a realm of irrationality, or a sphere of facts without meaningful relations, which the mind of man must rationally organize. Van Til insightfully pointed out that if the finite mind of man is the ultimate arbiter of the relationship between facts in history, his interpretation of reality is equally ultimately arbitrary and meaningless. For human knowledge to be possible there must be real relations set between facts by an intelligence ontologically greater and distinct from that of man’s. Hence, God and God’s eschatological plan are the necessary preconditions for human thought. Only God’s original interpretation of the facts of history in his eternal decree can meaningfully legislate the relationship between facts. Man’s epistemic job, then, is not to be rationally legislative as Kant thought, but to be receptive of the information about the facts of creation and their covenantal and eschatological relations as revealed by God.7

We can complete the premises of our argument as follows:

5. Therefore, if analogical reasoning is not the case, then knowledge is impossible 

As such, we have successfully argued for the transcendental necessity of the doctrine of analogy. The argument in full premise-conclusion form can be stated as follows:

1. If analogical reasoning is not the case, then there is no comprehensive pre-interpretation of all facts

2. If there is no comprehensive pre-interpretation of all facts, then (a) the facts are brute facts, and (b) man’s interpretation is wholly original

3. If (a), then skepticism results and knowledge is impossible 

4. If (b), then subjectivism results and knowledge is impossible.

5. Therefore, if analogical reasoning is not the case, then knowledge is impossible

References

1. Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, notes for chapter 7, no. 12

2. Introduction to Systematic Theology, 167.

3. Van Til, Apologetics, 27

4. Survey of Christian Epistemology, 203.

5. Defense of the Faith, 138.

6. Van Til’s Apologetic, notes for chapter 5, no. 219

7. ANALOGICAL KNOWLEDGE: A SYSTEMATIC INTERPRETATION OF CORNELIUS VAN TIL’S THEOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY