The Authority of Scripture

In this post I will be responding to an article posted here. The author attempts to explicate how a Christian evidentialist should understand the claim that Scripture should be our highest authority. The author begins by noting:

Many Christians believe that it is wrong to offer unbelievers evidence for the truth of Christianity.[1] They argue that the traditional method of apologetics dishonors Scripture by not giving it the respect it is due. The concern is that offering evidence for the truth of Scripture gives evidence more weight than Scripture.

He then proceeds to offer the following argument:

The argument might be framed this way:

1. If some activity requires us to treat something as a higher authority than Scripture, as Christians, we should not do it.
2. Giving evidence for the truth of Scripture requires us to treat evidence as a higher authority than Scripture.
3. Therefore, as Christians, we should not give evidence for the truth of Scripture.

In the relevant footnote, the author notes that he has presuppositionalists in mind when he mentions that many Christians believe it is wrong to present evidence for Christianity. However, this could not be more mistaken. As any competent covenantal (commonly termed “presuppositional”) apologist would note, there is nothing objectionable about presenting evidence for the truth of Christianity. What we would do is make a distinction between evidence presented in a pre-dogmatic context (that is, to prove the truth of Christianity in a neutral fashion) and evidence presented in a dogmatic fashion (as merely confirming a pre-existing faith commitment to the truth of Christianity). We object to the former, not the latter; presenting evidence does not necessarily compromise the authority of Scripture. As such, we can easily deny the second premise of the author’s argument. The presentation of evidence does not inherently dishonor Scripture since evidence can be presented within the context of the Christian worldview. Basically, then, the argument that the author argues against is nothing but a straw man - it is not an argument a covenantal apologist would present.

The above consideration is sufficient as a response to the post. However, there are still some points of interest that require further discussion. The author goes on to distinguish between deontic and epistemic authorities.

A deontic authority is roughly an authority which is able to tell you how you should act. Examples would include your boss or a police officer. These are individuals who can, to some extent, tell you what to do.

An epistemic authority is quite different. Epistemic authorities can tell you what you should believe. Examples would include a scholar, a doctor, or some other sort of expert. These are knowledgeable individuals who can be appropriately called “authorities” in their respective fields.

The key distinction between a deontic authority and an epistemic authority lies in the domains over which they exert their authority. Deontic authorities tell you howto behave. Epistemic authorities tell you what to believe.

This distinction is quite helpful as it gives much needed clarity to the subject matter. It should be obvious that, as covenantal apologists, we would affirm that Scripture is both a deontic and epistemic authority. Not just that, Scripture is also both the highest deontic and the highest epistemic authority. The author, however, notes:

In the first place, we need to observe that beliefs which are held on the basis of epistemic authorities inherently have weaker justification than beliefs held on the basis of evidence.

The reason given for this is that reliance on an epistemic authority creates an extra link in the chain between the believer and the truth of the belief. In other words, one must hope that said epistemic authority is being honest, not mistaken, not deceived, etc. This, according to the author, reduces the inherent strength of the justification provided by epistemic authorities. As the author notes:

The indirectness of the belief allows more opportunities for mistakes to be made. So whenever a belief is held on the basis of an authority, it necessarily has a lower probability of being true than a belief based directly on evidence.

We must note, however, that this is true only because, in general, epistemic authorities are humans.  They are fallible and could  be mistaken or deliberately deceitful. In other words, the weaker justification provided by epistemic authorities is due to the fact that these epistemic authorities are human and their testimonies are subject to human limitations. These limitations, however, do not apply to Scripture. We must remember that Scripture is God’s Word - His testimony - and as such it possesses all the perfections of God Himself. We can say, then, that God is the perfect epistemic authority. Since God is perfectly reliable, infallible, omniscient, all these attributes apply to His revelatory media as well. So when the author claims that,

The upshot here is that epistemic authorities are not valuable because of anything intrinsic to that authority

...we must point out that this is straightforwardly false in the case of Scripture! The justification provided by God as an epistemic authority is in no sense weaker than that provided by direct evidence. On the contrary, the justification provided by God is way stronger! God, because of who He is, and Scripture, because it is from God, provide us with maximal epistemic justification. The author notes that,

To minimize this risk [associated with relying on epistemic authorities], it is crucial that we have good reasons for regarding an authority as reliable.

But what better reason is there to regard an authority as reliable than the fact that this authority is infallible, perfect, and omniscient? Scripture as an epistemic authority grants us the convenience of easy contact with truth without the risk associated with human epistemic authorities. With we have with Scripture is maximal justification with zero risk of falsehood. The mistake the author makes is failing to recognize the special epistemic status of Scripture as God’s Word. He goes on to say:

So it is not possible, in principle, to have a highest epistemic authority if this is meant to be understood as an authority being one’s primary source of knowledge. A subject must always choose to believe what an authority says. And to make an informed decision about which authorities to believe, one needs access to independent evidence.

But again, this is only true if we neglect the special epistemic status of Scripture as God’s Word. Since Scripture is perfectly reliable and infallible, there is no reason why it cannot function as our primary source of knowledge - our highest epistemic authority. We only require independent evidence because human epistemic authorities are fallible and do not  confer maximal justification. This requirement is unnecessary in the case of Scripture because it is the testimony of a perfectly reliable, infallible God.

The author writes:

But since evidence is required to adjudicate between competing authority claims, it retains an epistemic priority over any authority.

This is true depending on the status of said authority in one’s overarching worldview structure. Appeals to evidence are ineffective against one’s most fundamental, deep-seated, heart commitments (presuppositions) because these exercise the highest epistemic authority over one’s thinking - including one’s evaluation of evidence! Hence, if by “evidence” the author means a direct appeal to certain facts, then evidence does not exercise epistemic priority over epistemic authorities that seat at the deepest level of one’s web of beliefs. If by “evidence”, however, the author means an internal or transcendental critique of worldviews, then he has become a presuppositionalist!

In conclusion, then, the article fails to properly understand the claims of covenantal apologists, recognize the special epistemic status of Scripture, and fails to show that Scripture cannot serve as our highest epistemic authority.