God and the Problem of Individuation

 

The transcendental argument for Christian theism, as conceived by Cornelius Van Til, aims to demonstrate the necessity of the Christian worldview for any intelligible experience. One of the most fundamental elements of this transcendental program is the philosophical problem of the One and the Many. Apart from being a potent philosophical argument for Christianity, the One and Many problem is a useful conceptual tool for analyzing and spelling out the areas in which unbelieving philosophical systems fail. That is, a lot of the philosophical problems that plague the non-Christian worldview can be characterized, in one way or another, as instances of the One and Many problem. 

A survey of the relevant literature surrounding the defense of the transcendental argument for Christian theism would reveal a tendency for Van Tilians to undermine unbelieving worldviews by pressing problems relating to the lack of order and unity in the objects of knowledge. Arguments that appeal to the problem of induction, the problem of brute factuality, skepticism as a problem of connection, and arguments from the unity of knowledge, can be seen as instances of a broader problem which we may call the “problem of unification”. These arguments point out the nability of the unbeliever’s philosophy to provide unity, order, connection, or coherence between the objects of knowledge (or between objects and subjects of knowledge).

However, conceptualizing this issue as analogous to the One and Many problem, this problem of unification should have a cousin problem. If the problem of unification, broadly construed, concerns finding unity in diversity, then this cousin problem would concern finding diversity in unity. This we may call the problem of individuation. This problem has received sparse attention in the literature and this article aims to remedy that. I shall attempt to critique the unbelieving system of thought by applying this problem of individuation. This treatment would not be exhaustive as this article merely aims to provide a new path for further study and research. 

Individuals and Individuation

First of all, it is important that we make clear what exactly individuation is. There are two distinct (but related) senses of the term “individuation”. There is the metaphysical sense of the term, and the epistemic or cognitive sense of the term. E.J. Lowe explains the epistemic sense of individuation thusly:

In the epistemic sense, individuation is a cognitive activity-something that we, or intelligent beings in general, can do. For someone to individuate an object, in this sense, is for that person to 'single out' that object as a distinct object of perception, thought, or linguistic reference.

(Emphasis original. E.J. Lowe, Individuation, The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics)

It is obvious that individuation, in this sense, is an integral part of human cognitive activity. Our experience would not make much sense without it. In our daily lives, we constantly single out various objects in our perception, thought, and speech. However, individuation in this sense would not be possible without individuation in the metaphysical sense. Before one can single out something, there must be something to be singled out out there in reality. 

Individuation in the metaphysical sense is an ontological relationship between entities: what 'individuates' an object, in this sense, is whatever it is that makes it the single object that it is-whatever it is that makes it one object, distinct from others, and the very object that it is as opposed to any other thing.

An individual, then, is something that is individuated in this metaphysical sense. Two other terms worth defining are “particular” and “object”. A particular is contrasted with “universal” and is conceived of as that which instantiates (is an instance of) a universal. An object is contrasted with “property” and is conceived of as that which “possesses” or “bears” a property. It would help our cause to narrow our discussion to “individual substance”, which Lowe characterizes as “an individual object which is capable of independent existence-one which could exist even in the absence of any other such object (in the sense of ‘could’ in which this expresses metaphysical possibility).”

With these clarifications and definitions out of the way, we can go ahead to characterize the “problem of individuation”.

The Problem of Individuation 

So what exactly is the problem of individuation? Since we made a distinction between the epistemic and metaphysical senses of “individuation”, one may suspect that there are two distinct problems of individuation. This suspicion would be correct. We can indeed formulate two distinct problems of individuation—the epistemic problem of individuation, and the metaphysical problem of individuation. The metaphysical problem of individuation has received the most attention in the philosophical literature and would be the main focus of this article. However, the epistemic problem would receive a brief treatment as well.

We can characterize the problems this way: the epistemic  problem of individuation inquires as to the possibility of individuation (in the epistemic sense of the term), while the metaphysical problem of individuation asks what explains the individuality of individual substances. The epistemic problem aims to uncover the preconditions of the intelligibility of individuation, especially in light of the metaphysical commitments of certain worldviews. The metaphysical problem is concerned with what makes individual substances what they are. Is it something intrinsic to them? Or a certain property? Or a relation? There have been various answers to this question and we shall consider them shortly. 

God’s Counsel: The Only Rational Principle of Individuation 

Before exploring the metaphysical problem of individuation, we should give some attention to the epistemic problem. We can highlight the problem by asking the question: what is the difference between one fact and another fact? What is the difference, for example, between this orange and this apple? A precondition of knowing a fact is being able to distinguish it from another fact. If I cannot distinguish between an apple and an orange, then I know neither. Individuation presupposes differentiation. One cannot ‘single out’ an object if one is unable to distinguish that object from its surroundings. 

Notice that differentiation cannot be done without reference to a system of related facts. If I am to distinguish between an apple and an orange, I must possess knowledge of certain categories, relations, kinds, classes, and concepts—a “system”. 

This brings us to the crucial difference between the Christian and non-Christian views of reality. As pointed out elsewhere, the non-Christian is committed to brute factuality since he rejects God’s eternal plan as that in virtue of which the facts are what they are. The Christian holds that since God’s eternal plan and counsel is what makes the facts what they are, system precedes factuality. That is, the facts are already rationally ordered, related, and systematized prior to man’s experience of them. The Christian, then, can be said to possess an ultimately rational principle of individuation. A principle of individuation can be thought of as that which makes the facts (individual substances or objects) what they are. The proximate principle of individuation for all human thinkers would be the system (categories, relations, kinds, classes, concepts) which that thinker has built up so far. That system, in a sense, makes the objects what they are (an object is an apple because it possesses the relevant properties which are dictated by the system). But the Christian holds that our finite system is merely an analogous reflection of the more complete and comprehensive system which is God’s eternal plan. Our system is merely derivative of God’s system, and it is God’s system that ultimately makes the facts what they are. For the Christian, then, the ultimate principle of individuation is the eternal counsel of a personal God who relates all facts in accordance with a rational plan. It is a rational principle. 

The non-Christian’s principle of individuation, however, is ultimately non-rational. For him, man’s system is not derivative but original. For him, the ultimate principle of individuation is not God’s counsel, but Chance. The facts are what they are ultimately due to Chance—there is no rationality behind the facts. The facts do not belong to any rational system prior to their coming into contact with man’s mind. They are purely non-rational, “brute facts”, and it is man that must introduce any kind of rationality or system to them. 

But notice that if the facts are inherently non-rational, then it is in principle impossible to distinguish one fact from another fact. We have already noted that individuation requires a system. But purely non-rational facts are inherently non-systematic in nature—they bear no relation to anything else. Brute facts, then, cannot be individuated. If Chance is the ultimate principle of individuation, then individuation becomes impossible. Cornelius Van Til put it this way:

Individuation by a non-rational principle would lead to pure indetermination—to an infinite regress.

“Pure indetermination” is the negation of all difference, or a blank unity. Any non-rational principle of individuation would inevitably lead to this conclusion. Something similar has been argued elsewhere. In this context, we can phrase the argument this way: Differentiation requires objective relations between facts, so if a non-rational principle is to individuate facts at all, it must relate the facts somehow. But if the facts are related by some abstract, non-rational principle, then each individual fact must bear a relation to this principle. However, for this relation to obtain, there must be another principle that relates each individual fact to the aforementioned principle. This sparks an infinite regress with the result that no fact is related at all which entails that no fact is differentiated—pure indetermination. The counsel of God must be taken as the ultimate principle of individuation if individuation, in the epistemic sense, is to be possible at all. Van Til’s words come to mind: 

If the world and its facts are not what they are, ultimately, by the counsel of God . . . then there can be no distinguishing between a hawk and a handsaw. As already discussed, the only alternative to the counsel of God as the ultimate principle of individuation is that of Chance. In Chaos and Old Night all is blank.

(Defense of the Faith, 300)

Brute facts cannot be individuated or differentiated from each other. If there is no rational system that precedes the facts and facilitates objective relations between them, then we would be unable to differentiate one fact from another. To differentiate an apple from an orange, we must appeal to their respective properties. But in a chance world, these properties are merely subjective concepts arbitrarily imposed on non-rational facts by the mind of man. The difference between an apple and an orange, on this view, is merely subjective and illusory. In Chaos and Old Night, all is blank. 

The Metaphysical Problem of Individuation 

As mentioned already, the metaphysical problem of individuation concerns finding what individuates an individual substance. What makes it one individual substance of a certain kind and the very individual substance that it is? It should be noted that individuation in this metaphysical sense is a determination relation. That is, whatever individuates an object makes it the case that that object is the very object that it is. It is an explanatory relation: an object’s individuator explains why that object is the very object it is. 

When understood this way, our discussion in the previous section applies here too. In a chance world, with no personal God in providential control of all facts, there can be no relations between facts. This would include individuation relations. As it turns out, Chance births facts that are so discrete and individual that they lose their individuality! Pure diversity collapses into pure unity. Apart from the counsel of God setting the relations between facts, every fact would stand on its own. But every fact standing on its own would entail the destruction of all individuality. This would explain why all attempts to solve the metaphysical problem of individuation apart from a Christian worldview have been utter failures. Individuation requires that objects stand in very unique relations to their individuators. 

Individuation cannot, however, be by any relation an object bears to another wholly distinct substance. This follows from what it means to be an individual. It would seem that an individual substance can exist and be the very substance it is in the absence of any other wholly distinct substance.

It may be suggested that a substance is individuated by its intrinsic, non-relational properties, conceived as universals. However, this approach doesn’t work. As Lowe points out:

We can surely conceive, with Max Black, a world containing two material spheres qualitatively exactly similar to one another in every respect ... But if the two spheres, being individual substances, are therefore determinately distinct entities (unlike the two orbital electrons of a helium atom), the universals that it exemplifies cannot be what make one of the spheres the very sphere that it is as opposed to the other sphere. So an individual substance cannot, apparently, be individuated by its intrinsic properties, nor, a fortiori, can it simply be constituted by those properties (i.e. it cannot simply be a 'bundle' of coinstantiated universals).

As mentioned previously, individual substances need to stand in very unique relations to their individuators. The relation a substance stands in with a universal is not unique. There are other distinct substances that stand in the same kind of relation. Universals, then, cannot individuate. 

Perhaps, then, individuation is by matter, form, or some combination thereof. It may be said that substances are individuated by their constituent matter. Setting aside the dubious assumption that only material substances can be individual, matter cannot individuate because it lacks intrinsic unity. The same matter that makes up an object may very well make up another object, or just be scattered across the universe. Form (a thing’s shape) cannot individuate either since there could be other similar substances with the same shape or which exemplify the same universals.  A combination of matter and form, in the sense of a particular matter exemplifying a certain form, cannot individuate because we would want to  allow that material substances could undergo change with respect to its constituent matter. Lowe expounds in this point thusly:

After all, if material spheres can undergo a change of their constituent matter, we can in principle envisage circumstances in which two different material spheres undergo a complete exchange of their constituent matter, so that the piece of matter con- stituting one of the spheres at an earlier time later comes to constitute the other sphere.

If neither properties (conceived as universals), nor form, nor matter can individuate, then maybe properties, conceived as particulars, can. These have commonly been called tropes. Instead of properties, like redness, being universals which can be exemplified by multiple objects, properties could be conceived of as particular tropes. We can have various, particular redness tropes, for example. Tropes may resemble each other but, being particulars, they are numerically distinct. This entails that no two objects can have the same trope. So perhaps substances can be individuated by their respective tropes. 

The problem, however, is that it makes sense to say that tropes are themselves individuated by the objects of which they are properties. If so, then it would be viciously circular to say that tropes individuate objects. It is a vicious circularity because individuation, as an explanatory relation, cannot be symmetrical. If it is denied that tropes are individuated, even in part, by the substances to which they belong, then why shouldn’t a particular trope belong to more than one substance? Why shouldn’t tropes “migrate” from one substance to another? If such is possible, then two identical substances can undergo a complete exchange of their tropes. But if so, then tropes cannot individuate. 

The failure of these approaches have led philosophers to posit the existence of entities that are non-qualitative non-objects such as “substratum” (also called bare particulars) or “haecceities” (literally “thisness”). But such entities create impenetrable mysteries and seem like ad hoc stipulations posited to solve a difficult philosophical problem. Furthermore, it seems that these entities would be self-individuating. But if so, then why not just maintain that ordinary individual substances themselves are self-individuating?

Now is a good time to explore the notion of self-individuation. Earlier we mentioned that a chance world precludes there being any relations between facts, and that this seems to imply the impossibility of individuation. However, the assumption was that substances cannot be self-individuating. But the notion of self-individuation does not seem obviously incoherent. It is certainly possible that certain things about an object make it the case that it is the very object that it is. But it is difficult to see what a plausible account of self-individuation would look like. There seems to be nothing about individual substances themselves that explains why they are the very things they are. For a substance to individuate itself, it must possess a unique property which it cannot share with any other substance, and possess that property in virtue of itself. This doesn’t seem plausible, especially for entities that exist contingently. 

Self-individuation does seem to make sense in the case of persons, or subjects of experience, however. It seems plausible to think that even if there were another person like me with the same qualities and feelings, such a would still differ from me in virtue of not being me—in virtue of not possessing my first-person perspective. Such a perspective, it seems, cannot be shared by anything else. Lowe calls it a “perspectival property”:

The property of being me, if it exists, might indeed be called a 'perspectival' property-a property which something has in virtue of being thought of or grasped from a particular 'point of view' (its own).

However, it would be extravagant to suppose that all individual substances somehow grasp themselves in this fashion. Also, it seems this is insufficient to individuate even subjects of experience since we are not always conscious. But this highlights a relationship between cognitive individuation and metaphysical individuation. Cognitive individuation seems to bestow perspectival properties upon the objects which are thought of from a subject’s point of view. These properties seem to be unique to whatever object they are bestowed upon. Being finite, however, human cognition cannot individuate substances. We would like to think that objects possess their individuality independent of our conception or perception of them. But God’s cognition is not finite. We know that God’s mind is constructive of the facts. Even before their instantiation, God has already conceived of every fact and determined its nature. It is God’s cognitive individuation that gives rise to metaphysical individuation. Every object has a unique perspectival property bestowed upon it in virtue of it being thought of from the divine point of view. God’s counsel, therefore, is the ultimate metaphysical principle of individuation.