Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and the Myth of Neutrality

It has been something of a recent trend in contemporary philosophy of religion to appeal to considerations of theoretical virtue and Bayesian probability theory in order to adjudicate between competing worldviews. This move has been championed mostly by Graham Oppy, considered by many to be the best defender of atheism alive, however many more atheist and theist philosophers have adopted this approach. What I aim to show in this brief article is that the method proposed by thinkers such as Oppy is far from a neutral method, and is insufficient to settle the dispute between competing worldviews. 

This method treats Theism and Naturalism as theories or hypotheses and aims to figure out whether there are any reasons to prefer one over the other. In his book, The Best Argument Against God, Oppy provides a number of theoretical virtues that would serve as the criteria for the comparison of the two views.

The first is simplicity, which he characterizes this way:

(a) Simplicity: If everything else is equal, we should prefer the more simple theory to the less simple theory. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer (and less complex) primitive entities. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that invokes fewer (and less complex) primitive features. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that appeals to fewer (and less complex) primitive principles. 

The next is “goodness of fit” which he explains thusly:

(b) Goodness of Fit: If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that makes the best fit with the data. There are complexities here. In many cases, we know that our data are imperfect: our data contain errors, or noise, or the like. The ‘best fit’ with the data may itself involve some kind of trade off between simplicity and what we might call ‘direct fit’ with the data.

Then “explanatory breadth”:

(c) Explanatory Breadth: If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that explains more. There are two dimensions to this. On the one hand, all else being equal, we should prefer the theory that leaves less unexplained. (This is closely related to the idea that, if everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that invokes fewer primitive entities and features.) On the other hand, all else being equal, we should prefer the theory that ‘unifies’ the wider domain of features. (Again, this is also related to the idea that, if everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that invokes fewer primitive entities, features and principles.)

Finally, “predictive fruitfulness”:

(d) Predictive Fruitfulness: If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that makes the most accurate predictions of future data. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that prompts the most fruitful future inquiry – that is, the theory that suggests the more fruitful avenues for future investigation.

The epistemologically self-conscious Christian will take issue with this method that has become so rampant in philosophy of religion. 

First and foremost, he would take issue with phrasing the dispute as one over Theism and Naturalism, rather than Christianity and non-Christianity. Scripture clearly teaches us that there is a philosophy that is according to Christ, and one that is not according to Christ. We are taught that one is either for Christ or against Him. That is, the Bible clearly teaches that there is a fundamental antithesis between the Christian and unbelieving views of reality. To then phrase the worldview dispute as being over some vague Theism and Naturalism (or as anything else other than Christianity and all form of unbelief), is to blur the antithesis and reject the clear teaching of Scripture. Hence, this method, far from being a neutral one, rules out Christian theism from the beginning of its investigation. 

Secondly, appeals to so-called theoretical virtues cannot settle worldview disputes for a couple of reasons. First, beliefs about theoretical virtues cannot be justified apart from one’s worldview commitments. Why, for example, should we accept simplicity as virtuous as opposed to extravagance? The answer to this question would depend on one’s worldview. Hence, worldviews precede theoretical virtues and the latter cannot be used to adjudicate the former. Second, and related to the first point, beliefs about the ontology of theoretical virtues would depend on one’s worldview. Why think there are theoretical virtues at all? Questions such as this are logically prior to the use of theoretical virtues to compare theories, and they cannot be answered without reference to a particular worldview. To appeal to theoretical virtues to adjudicate between worldviews is to put the cart before the horse. Finally, an implicit assumption of such a method is that intellectual evaluations can take place independently of Christian revelation. But such an assumption is a straightforward denial of the Christian position which is one of the positions under examination! This method, then, is not neutral but straightforwardly question-begging. 

What this shows is that philosophers have fallen prey to the myth of neutrality. To rationally settle the dispute between the Christian and the unbeliever, we must avoid systematically begging crucial questions. There must be paradigm shift in philosophy of religion towards a more transcendental method of inquiry, and Christian philosophers must become epistemologically self-conscious and constantly push the antithesis.