Does Logic Presuppose Christianity? — Part 5: The Ethics of Logic

Continuing the discussion on the Van Tillian argument from logic, we could consider logic from yet another perspective: ethics. From this perspective, the apologist can argue from the normativity of logic. Part of our intuitions about logic informs us that logical truths aren’t just truths - they are “laws”. Hence, the name “laws of logic” or “laws of thought”. They are thought of as not just telling us what is true, but what it right when it comes to reasoning and thinking. For example, the law of non-contradiction may tell us that a proposition and its negation cannot both be true at the same time and in the same sense. However, the law of non-contradiction is taken to do more than that: it tells us that, in our thinking, we should avoid contradictions. If someone runs into contradictions in their reasoning, such a person is seen as violating some law and doing something wrong  or inappropriate. This means that laws of logic are normative and prescriptive; they prescribe how we ought to think or reason. Laws of logic, in a sense, are epistemic norms.

Epistemic norms can be contrasted with moral norms. They are not the same thing however, they are analogous. Moral norms prescribe how we, as humans, ought to act or behave. Meanwhile epistemic norms prescribe how we ought to think, reason, or hold beliefs. That is, moral norms deal with behavior while epistemic norms deal with thinking. 

Laws of logic, like laws of morality, are seen as normative standards. That is, they are seen as standards of judgment or evaluation. They are standards for what constitutes right or wrong reasoning. We can appeal to laws of logic to judge a person or reasoning process as rational/logical or irrational/illogical just like we can appeal to laws of morality to judge a person or action as moral or immoral. Calling something moral/logical or immoral/illogical is a value judgment, and value judgments require normative standards. The laws of logic are seen as fixed standards which are binding upon human subjects. It doesn’t matter how a subject feels, it would always be epistemically wrong to reason in contradictions.

How does all this relate to Christian Theism? The core claim is that epistemic norms (such as laws of logic) can only exist within the context of a Christian worldview. This is because a non-Christian worldview cannot sustain a coherent basis for fixed normative standards. To see this, we have to first examine Christianity and its account of epistemic norms.

Epistemic Norms Within a Christian Context

Fundamental to a Christian view of the world is the existence of the absolute, personal, self-contained, and self-sufficient Triune God. This God is wholly wise and possesses coherence in His Being and in His mind. This God created man in His image and likeness. This God, through voluntary self-disclosure, built-in certain laws into the mind of man, which he uses to gain knowledge of the world around him, as part of general revelation. On this view, then, man seeks to emulate his Creator by thinking like Him even though it is merely on a creaturely level. The internal coherence and wisdom within the Being and mind of God serves as the archetype of rationality. The laws of thought (epistemic norms) in the mind of man are merely analogous reflections of that wisdom and coherence. Man, being created in God’s image, has an obligation to emulate God as His image-bearer on Earth.

Laws of logic, on this view, are grounded in the Being of the Absolutely Personal Triune God. God is absolute because He requires nothing outside of Himself to complete or define Him; nothing is above Him and He is the highest possible standard. He is also personal; there is no form of impersonality in His Being. His very character is the basis for epistemic norms. Epistemic norms, and laws of logic, distinguish between thinking that aligns with the “thinking” of God and thinking which does not. God’s “thinking” (wisdom and internal coherence) is the standard which all human thinkers must try to reflect. They do so by adhering to epistemic norms which are analogous reflections of God’s wisdom.

Failure of Non-Christian Accounts

The Christian basis for epistemic norms is the Absolute Person - the Trinitarian God of the Bible. All non-Christian systems either deny the Absolute, the Personality, or both. That is, all non-Christian systems, in the final analysis, deny the existence of an Absolute Person. Such denials render them unable to properly account for normative standards such as laws of logic.

Denying the personality in God renders normative standards unintelligible. Normative standards only make sense within the context of personal relations. A rock has no obligations and cannot act in accordance with norms. A rock cannot be said to be irrational or immoral. This is because rocks are impersonal objects. If normative standards are grounded in impersonal objects, then they cease to be normative or law-like in character. One cannot have an obligation to an impersonal object. Worldviews which deny the personality in God include atheism, naturalism, Unitarian religions, Platonism, materialism, etc. These views either have to deny the existence of normative standards altogether or ground them in human persons.

Denying the absolute in God renders normative standards ultimately relative. If normative standards are not grounded in an absolute, then they become relative. This is because one can always question the authority of a non-absolute. A standard grounded in a non-absolute cannot be binding because there is no justification for accepting that standard over the standard of another non-absolute. If we deny the existence of an Absolute Person, all we are left with is a plurality of non-absolute persons each with their own standards. And without an absolute standard, there is no way to non-arbitrarily decide which standard should be adopted. All that’s left would be subjective opinion or preferences. This problem is faced by worldviews which ground normative standards in human persons or non-absolute deities.

Categorical vs. Hypothetical Norms

Throughout this discussion we have assumed that epistemic norms are categorical. Categorical norms are norms that must be followed irrespective of a subject’s desires or motives. We would like to think that laws of thought, as epistemic norms, are categorical in nature. That is, they are binding and obligatory regardless of what a subject feels, thinks, or desires. However, it can be argued that epistemic norms need not be categorical in nature. Epistemic norms such as laws of logic, it is said, can just be conceived of as hypothetical norms.

Hypothetical norms are more conditional in nature. They can be formulated using conditional statements of the form “if...then”. Hypothetical norms are norms based on the subject’s desires and motives. For example, one can say “if you want to pass your exams, you ought to study”. The above conditional is not a categorical imperative, it is not something you absolutely have to do or obey. However, it is something you must do if you want to achieve a certain goal. In the same way, then, epistemic norms can be construed as hypothetical. For example, “if you want to arrive at truth, you should avoid contradictions in your thinking”.

By construing epistemic norms as hypothetical instead of categorical, the non-Christian seems to have a way to accommodate them into his system. Is this option viable? We can raise two problems for the idea that laws of thought are merely hypothetically normative.

Firstly, there seems to be no way to distinguish hypothetical norms from mere conditionals. What is the difference between “if subject S wants to achieve goal X, then S ought to Y” and “if subject S wants to achieve goal X, then S must Y”? What is it about goals that explains why the antecedents (the if part of the conditional) of hypothetical norms proffer normativity while the antecedents of other kinds of conditionals do not? It makes no sense to say, for example, that “if a rock is to fall from a height, then it ought to be pushed”.

Secondly, the idea that laws of thought are merely hypothetically normative is self-defeating. We may choose to define correct reasoning (or rationality) with respect to adherence to certain epistemic norms (for example, laws of logic). But it can be asked why we should believe that definition of rationality. Someone else could just as easily posit another set of (contradictory) epistemic norms and define rationality in accordance with that. And since no set of epistemic norms is categorical, we cannot non-arbitrarily adjudicate between them. We cannot choose which definition we ought to believe. This means that our beliefs about rationality are unjustified. This ultimately implies that none of our beliefs are rational - including the belief that epistemic norms are merely hypothetical!

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have seen how the covenantal apologist can argue that logic presupposes Christianity from an ethical and normative standpoint. In the next (and final!) installment, we examine the relation of logic to facts and how that shows the necessity of a Christian worldview for logic.