Islam, Neoplatonism, and the Concept of an Absolute God

This is a dialogue I had concerning whether the gods of Islam and Neoplatonism can be absolute.



Person 1: Why would probability be unintelligible on Islam or Neoplatonic theism?


Daniel: because none of them posits an absolute God.


Person 2: that is straightforwardly false but okay.


Daniel:


It’s not.


Neither the God of Islam nor the god of “Neoplatonic theism” are absolute.


Person 2: please demonstrate that.


Daniel:


God of Islam is a unity. Therefore, prior to creation there was only one person. Such a God cannot be maximally loving, or good, or personal, because all these things only make sense within the context of interpersonal relations. Hence, the Islamic God *needs* his creation in order to express his attributes. Hence is not self-sufficient or absolute.


The Neoplatonic god has not revealed himself. His existence is only known through proofs. This makes such a god logically derivative. A logically derivative god is finite and cannot be absolute.

Person 2:


(1) your critique against Islamic theology presumes that we can have a priori knowledge of what maximal goodness or maximal love is. And why should God _express_ his attributes? He doesn't need to do so in order to have them.


(2) Massive non-sequitur: it doesn't follow from the fact that the Neoplatonic God is known only through proofs that he is "logically derivative" in an ontological sense.


Daniel:


(1) it doesn’t presuppose that. All we need to know is that love, etc. presuppose interpersonal relations. And a being that has such attributes maximally would have it to a maximal degree (whatever that is). So both a maximal and a less than maximal expression of that attribute requires interpersonal relations.


If he doesn’t express his attributes, then they remain a mere potentiality in him. Once again, it’s the same conclusion. God needs his creation in order to actualize his attributes. Which means he’s not absolute.


(2) I’m not making that inference. The point is that since the Neoplatonic god has not revealed himself, the Neoplatonic theist cannot have rational warrant for any claims about the existence or nature of his god. To this, it would be replied that there are logical proofs for the existence end nature of this god. However, if those proofs are the only source of information about this being, then it follows that this being is logically derivative. There is no warrant for the claim that this being is not derivative in an ontological sense.


Person 2:


(1) Why should an entity be engaged in the act of love in order to be maximally loving? He doesn't. And no, none of God's attributes are mere potentialities, since one can parse each of them in terms of _active potentialities._


(2) What does it even mean for something to be "logically derivative"? If you mean something in the sense of having any kind of dependence, that is what you need to demonstrate, not assert.


Daniel:


(1) is my chair loving (maximally or otherwise)? What’s the difference between the Islamic god and my chair in this respect? What you’re saying is that god has an attribute that he can’t show or express without the help of his creation which just proves the point that he isn’t absolute. An absolute God does not need anything outside of himself to define or complete him. He is the way he is regardless of any external factors. The Islamic god, however, can change depending on his creation. He is correlative to creation and hence not absolute.


(2) what do you not understand about the term “logically derivative”?


Person 2:


(1) Chairs are artefacts and have no active potentials of any sort. 

«What you're saying is that God has an attribute that he can't show or express without the help of his creation»

No, what I am saying is that God has some attributes which are expressed in virtue of creating. That is not the same as holding that he _needs_ creatures. One could easily take a parody argument: God has the attribute of being the creator. He cannot manifest this without the existence of creatures, hence he _needs_ them in order to manifest it. Obviously this is absurd.


(2) I don't understand what "logically derivative" means as applied to anything other than propositions. It is propositions which are logically derivable, and therefore are derivative, from other propositions. Speaking of God (or any real ens) being logically derivative is a category error, but perhaps you mean something else by said term.


Daniel:


(1) there’s a difference. The act of creating does not bring about any change in God. All it brings about is an ad extra relation between God and creatures. However, for the Islamic god, creating humans brings about a change ad intra. 


(2) logically derivative means being only known through logical proofs. Being logically derivative has metaphysical implications.


Person 2:


(1) That the Islamic God changes ad intra I'm creation is something you need to substantiate either by showing that there is ijma` among Muslim theologians among this, or by demonstrating that syllogistically. 


(2) That is a highly non-standard usage of that term, but regardless, that being logically derivative has the metaphysical implications you claim is something you need to show, not assert.


Daniel: 


(1) I think I’ve argued that already. Love, kindness, goodness, etc. are necessarily interpersonal relations. But prior to creation, there are no social realities. So either love, etc are not essential attributes of the Islamic god, or this god became loving, etc. when he created meaning he is not absolute and independent of creation.


(2) a logically derivative god would be wholly comprehensible—there can be no darkness or mystery about him. He is fully penetrated by the light of human reason and logic. This negates transcendence and it places this god on the same metaphysical plane as man which makes him finite. Also, such a god cannot be absolute because there would be principles which are more fundamental than he is (the principles he was derived from). Such a god also cannot be absolute because he is surrounded by abstract possibility (possibility that is undetermined).


Person 2:


(1) Being loving can simply be defined as "If there exists some creature X, then God loves X". Under such a description, there doesn't need to be any creature in existence for God to have the attribute of being loving. That said, all of God's relations to creatures are logical ones, not real ones. 


(2) That a logically derivative God would be wholly comprehensible is what you need to show, not assert. In fact, if you knew of Neoplatonism, you wouldn't say such a thing, given that in this synthesis, God is arrived at by the via negativa and by analogical predication through the causal principle. 


And no, that some principles are epistemically prior to the knowledge of God's existence doesn't mean they are metaphysically prior to the fact of God's existence.


Daniel:


(1) that’s just another way of saying that God’s attribute of love is merely potential. On this view, being loving is simply possessing the ability to express love. God has a predisposition to be loving if certain conditions are met. But that means that there are external laws or conditions that preside over God. Therefore, he’s not absolute.


(2) that a logically derivative god is wholly comprehensible follows from the definition of “logically derivative”. All of this being’s attributes are derived from logical proofs. This being is defined by these proofs. It follows that we know everything about this being. There can never be any warrant for claiming that there are mysteries in this being. We can sum up this being as the set of all attributes that are proved through different arguments. There’s no room for mystery.


I did not claim that epistemic priority implies metaphysical priority. However, God’s (epistemic) dependence on more fundamental principles strips him of his transcendence and places him on the same metaphysical plane as man. An absolute or transcendent God cannot be logically derivative.

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