Analysis vs. Synthesis: An Epistemological Transcendental Argument

Traditionally, knowledge has been divided into two distinct categories: knowledge that is a priori and knowledge that is a posteriori. The former category has been taken to refer to knowledge gained wholly apart from experience of the world. The latter category has been taken to refer to knowledge that relies upon experience in some way. Similar to the above distinction is the analytic/synthetic distinction. Analytic truths, roughly speaking, are taken to be propositions that can be known to be true solely in virtue of the meanings of the terms. Analytic truths are also taken to be known a priori because one need not go out and experience the world in order to know analytic truths; their truths can be ascertained by merely an analysis of the meanings of the terms involved. On the other hand, synthetic truths are not true in virtue of the meanings of the terms. One must observe the world in order to ascertain their truth. Synthetic truths are thought of as being known a posteriori.

Greg Bahnsen argued rigorously against the analytic/synthetic distinction. I believe those arguments are successful. For our purposes, we do not need to hold to the distinction. The distinction is only useful for our understanding of what the terms “analysis” and “synthesis” mean with respect to epistemology. 

Analysis vs. Synthesis

We shall take knowledge which is analytic to be knowledge that does not require the subject to “look into” the world or experience. “Analysis”, then, is basically the act of gaining knowledge of the universe wholly apart from experience (a priori). “Synthesis” is the act of gaining knowledge of the universe by investigating the facts of the world and experience (a posteriori).  

A fundamental question that must be asked is whether analysis has priority over synthesis or whether synthesis has priority over analysis. Christian theism posits that God’s knowledge is analytic. Nathan Shannon puts it this way:

God's self-existence (or ontological self-sufficiency) implies the analyticity of his knowledge: there is for God no discourse in his reasoning, no inferential distance to travel, as to self-knowledge or knowledge of anything else. He knows himself perfectly, and he knows all things in a single instant of eternal omniscience.

(Nathan D. Shannon, The Foundations of Theo-centric Ethics, Torch Trinity Journal 19 (2016), 303.)

 

Cornelius Van Til echoes the same thoughts when he writes:

When God existed alone, there was no time universe, and there were no new facts arising. The only knowledge activity that existed was completed in the circuit of the mutually exhaustive personalities of the triune God. (Van Til, Introduction to Systematic Theology, 31.)

Also,

Christianity says that there once was no a posteriori aspect to knowledge at all 

 and

There never were any facts existing independent of God that he had to investigate. (Ibid., 30.)

James Douglas Baird clarifies this notion of the analyticity of God’s knowledge, saying: “By analytic, Van Til meant that God knows himself and creation exhaustively, independent of anything outside of himself: “God does not need to look beyond himself for additions to his knowledge.”” [James Douglas Baird, Analogical Knowledge, Mid-America Journal of Theology]

The takeaway here is that, given the Christian view, analysis is prior to and more fundamental than synthesis. God is the original knower and his method is analytic. Not only that, but God’s knowledge is constructive of the facts. This means that the objects of knowledge are what they are due to the activity of God’s mind. God knows all things eternally and in one single act of knowledge. And since God’s knowledge is constructive of created reality, he does not need to look outside himself in order to know the facts. God does not need to wait and see what facts arise before he adds them to his system of knowledge. This is what is meant by God’s knowledge being analytic. 

Humans, because we are finite and epistemically limited creatures, must rely on synthesis. We must go out and investigate the world of facts in order to gain knowledge of the universe. On Christianity, human knowledge is not original but rather analogical. We must think God’s thoughts after him. So both our analysis and our synthesis—our a priori and a posteriori methods of gaining knowledge—rely on God’s analysis. Analysis is prior to synthesis.

The anti-Christian view presents the opposite picture. For the unbeliever, synthesis is prior to analysis. On this view, man is the original knower and since he lacks omniscience, he must wait for the facts to come in before he can organize them into a system. He must look into the universe and gather the facts. His method must be synthetic because, for the unbeliever, there is no subject who’s knowledge can be purely analytic. The unbeliever may argue that he engages in analysis by means of categories such as logic and mathematics. But, in essence, his method must be synthetic. Even his analysis relies on synthesis. Given his view, it is possible that the objects of knowledge do not conform to his system of logic. It is also possible that there be some future fact which renders his logical systems impotent. All this to say that the unbeliever cannot avoid the priority of synthesis in his epistemological scheme. A denial of our point here is tantamount to the assertion that man is omniscient. But such an assertion is clearly absurd.

It is our contention that it is only on the Christian system that we can find a true priority of analysis over synthesis. We shall not argue this point here. We shall acknowledge that there may be other systems that may claim the priority of analysis over synthesis. However, we must hold that on closer examination these systems cannot make such claims because they make God and man correlative. For them, both God and man occupy the same island of Reality—an island surrounded by the troubled waters of Chance and bare possibility—and they must essentially gain knowledge the same way: by synthesis, waiting to see what facts arise.

Relativism in Metaphysics, Synthesis in Epistemology

If one thinks deeply about these issues, it is impossible to deny the interdependence of metaphysics and epistemology. We can see an illustration of this interdependence in this area as well. The priority of synthesis over analysis in epistemology corresponds to, and arises out of, a certain commitment in metaphysics. This metaphysical commitment is that of relativism. More precisely, it is a metaphysical commitment to a denial of an Absolute. Christianity is antithetical to metaphysical relativism because it is committed to an Absolute God. But as we have mentioned already, there may be other philosophical systems apart from the Christian one that claim to be committed to an Absolute and as such would lay claim to the priority of analysis over synthesis. However we must bear in mind that all unbelieving worldviews are relativistic in the sense that they deny an Absolute in some shape or form. This point is clear if one considers the atheistic, agnostic, or naturalistic flavors of unbelief. The point is less clear if one considers the so-called religious or theistic flavors of unbelief. Unfortunately, arguing this point is not our current concern.

Relativism in metaphysics entails the priority of synthesis in epistemology. Van Til puts the point well:

This insistence on “neutrality” is highly significant. “Neutrality” in method is not a mere matter of course, a hallmark of ordinary intelligence. It is imposed upon the metaphysical relativist. He cannot choose to be “prejudiced” or “biassed,” he must be “neutral.” Therefore he too is “biassed” and “prejudiced” in favor of “neutrality.” “Neutrality” is implied in the supposition of the “open” universe. If the universe is open, facts new to God and man constantly reinterpret the meaning of the old. Our method then must be basically synthetic; God’s method is also synthetic. He too must wait to see what the new facts may bring. God can do no more than man. He cannot interpret the meaning of reality to man since He has not yet interpreted himself. Therefore man must interpret for himself and must be neutral; his thought is creatively constructive.(https://presupp101.wordpress.com/articles/god-and-the-absolute/)

The metaphysical relativist is committed to the idea of an “open” universe. Without an Absolute God who exerts sovereign control over all of reality, the universe must be open. “Open” in the sense that the future of the universe is not a settled matter. There is no exhaustive and authoritative interpretation of reality as a whole and the course of the temporal universe is not set in stone. If the universe is open, new facts must arise. A new fact is simply a previously unknown fact—unknown by both God and man. And if new facts arise, epistemology must be fundamentally synthetic. Knowledge must be a constantly growing and evolving thing (for both God and man) if new facts are allowed to arise. If it were not—if there is a subject for whom all facts are available prior to their instantiation—then no fact can be new. Furthermore, this exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge would entail future facts. This would mean the universe is closed. Hence, relativism and synthesis go hand-in-hand. With this in mind, we have everything needed to lay out our transcendental argument.

Stating the Argument

We can now run the following argument:

(1) If Christian Theism is not the case, then metaphysical relativism is the case.

(2) If metaphysical relativism is the case, then synthesis must be prior to analysis.

(3) If synthesis is prior to analysis, then human knowledge is impossible.

(4) Human knowledge is possible.

(5) Therefore, Christian Theism is the case.

Premise (2) has already been established by the preceding discussion. Premise (4) is taken for granted. A defense of premise (1) is beyond the scope of this post as we have previously noted. If the reader is not satisfied with this, one can utilize the argument as a negative argument to transcendentally refute demonstrably relativistic views such as atheism, agnosticism, naturalism, etc. Deploying the argument positively would require a defense of the first premise but such a defense would not be undertaken here. Hence, the crucial premise in need of defense is premise (3) and it is to that we now turn.

The Problem of the Wholly New

We have already mentioned that the idea of an open universe entails the priority of synthesis in epistemology. However, the converse is also true. The priority of synthesis in epistemology entails the idea of an open universe. And the idea of an open universe entails the appearance of wholly new facts. These implications have profound philosophical consequences.

The existence of wholly new facts is antithetical to the existence of a comprehensive system of truth. A system presupposes a subject of knowledge. If there is a comprehensive system of truth wherein all facts are related then this system must exist in a mind. Systems of truth do not exist outside a subject because relations are conceptual in nature. All this is to say that if there is a comprehensive system of truth out there, then there must be a subject who’s knowledge is purely analytic. But the existence of wholly new facts entails that no such system exists. Wholly new facts, by definition, do not belong to any system of knowledge or truth. If they did, they would no longer be new. Prior to their instantiation, wholly new facts cannot bear any relation to any system of truth. In order to respect the newness and individuality of these facts, epistemology must be synthetic. 

The problem is that human knowledge presupposes system. That is, knowledge is systematic in nature. To gain knowledge of facts, we must accommodate them into a coherent system. However, wholly new facts make such systematization impossible. Knowledge, to be possible, must include generalities, laws, and universal principles. Without universal principles (such as logical and mathematical laws), we can’t know things. But universality can never be attained if wholly new facts are allowed to appear in the realm of experience. 

If synthesis is prior to analysis, then all facts are essentially wholly new. If this is the case, then the organization of a system of knowledge is impossible. Every fact must be treated and understood in isolation from every other and from any system. This is because these facts bear no prior relation to any other fact or any system of truth. To impose relations upon such facts would be arbitrary and contrary to their discrete character. Generalizations, universal principles, and laws would then have no application to facts. Nothing can be said about any fact in advance of its instantiation. This is the problem of the wholly new. 

For human knowledge to be possible, system must precede factuality. What this means is that there must be a comprehensive system of knowledge that precedes the instantiation of the facts. This system need not exist in the mind of man—but it must exist. However, for the metaphysical relativist who holds to the priority of synthesis in epistemology, factuality precedes system. We must experience the facts before erecting a system of knowledge. This is the essence of the synthetic method. But such a method renders the facts unknowable because it allows for wholly new facts to arise.

Conclusion

What we have argued is that metaphysical relativism renders human knowledge impossible because it holds to the priority of synthesis over analysis. And since every worldview that rejects Christianity is relativistic in one way or another, we have shown that Christianity is necessary for the possibility of human knowledge.