Stroud’s Got Nothing on Van Til: A Response to Dr. Alex Malpass

I was bored this morning and so I decided to get on YouTube. I clicked on the Search bar and typed in “Presuppositionalism”. My aim was to get a feel of the YouTube discourse surrounding Presuppositionalism because from what I remembered, it wasn’t very good. So I scrolled along, saw some videos I’ve watched before, and also some I haven’t watched. But I came across a particular video that caught my attention. It was titled “Alex Malpass on presuppositionalism” and you can find it here (https://youtu.be/-4PipfxAVAQ)

It caught my attention because (1) it was relatively short at just 7 minutes long, (2) because I actually rate Dr. Alex Malpass highly when it comes to critiquing Presuppositionalism. I believe that, unlike most other critics, he’s a bit more conversant with the relevant literature and his objections are a bit more interesting and philosophically nuanced due to the fact that he has a PhD in philosophy, and (3) because it was a relatively recent video being just 4 months old. So I was a bit interested to see whether he brings up anything fresh. 

The point he raised isn’t fresh or cutting-edge but I decided to talk about it because it is a topic I haven’t yet addressed on this blog so this would be a good opportunity to do so. Dr. Malpass talked about the Stroudian objection to transcendental arguments. And the Stroudian objection has really rattled the Van Tilian community especially if one considers the more academic side of things. There have been various responses, objections, and strategies used to try and avoid the Stroudian objection. But what exactly is the Stroudian objection? Well, it can be stated in many ways. Dr. Malpass states it one way when he says:

So let’s say someone is making an argument like: unless God exists then...logic, say, would be impossible or...experience would be unintelligible… so unless God existed, some thing that you take to be possible or coherent or true...wouldn’t be. And that thing is possible or coherent or true...so it must be that God exists ‘cause God is the thing that is presupposed by that thing [logic] being possible or coherent or true…. so what he [Stroud] says is...you gotta distinguish between that relation of presupposition being epistemic or metaphysical… if it’s epistemic...what’s going on is you’re saying “unless I believe that God exists, then...I wouldn’t be able to have coherent experience….and my experience is coherent”....the problem with that is the only thing you’re allowed to conclude is that it follows that you believe that God exists...the thing about the epistemic claim is that it doesn’t get you as far as you want to go..

Basically, the point is that there’s a distinction between establishing the epistemic necessity of belief in God and establishing the actual existence of God. Barry Stroud’s objection to transcendental arguments is that they only establish the transcendental (or conceptual) necessity of whatever it is they’re arguing for. But, the objection goes, establishing transcendental necessity does not establish the actual truth or existence of the thing in question. So, in terms of the transcendental argument for God (TAG), establishing that belief in God is transcendentally necessary does not establish that that belief is actually true. It may be necessary to believe that God exists for my experience to be intelligible, but it does not follow that my belief is true since it is possible that experience is wholly unintelligible (even though it’s impossible for me to conceive of it being that way). The Stroudian objection is based on a Kantian divide (similar to the noumena/phenomena distinction) between how we must conceive of the world and how the world actually is. The conceptual necessity of a belief does not establish its truth since the actual world need not be how we conceive of it.

However, I feel Dr. Malpass failed to appreciate the force and gravity of an argument that merely establishes the transcendental necessity of belief in God when he says “the problem with that is the only thing you’re allowed to conclude is that it follows that you believe that God exists”. A modest TAG (one that just establishes the transcendental necessity of belief in God) does not merely show that one has a belief in God. It shows that belief in God is rationally and conceptually necessary. What this implies is that it is impossible to rationally reject God’s existence. It also implies that everyone believes in God. These conclusions are quite satisfactory for the apologist. This is the reason I feel the Stroudian objection has been severely overrated by Van Tilians. If what we are concerned with is a cogent apologetic, then even a modest presentation of TAG is sufficient. By showing the rational necessity of Christianity, the apologist has done his job. The unbeliever has no rational basis for his rejection of Christianity and an irrefutable, rational defense of Christianity has been put forth. The apologist has shown that the only way the unbeliever can reject Christianity is if he embraces irrationality. This shows that he has no excuse (rational defense). The Stroudian objection, then, does not do as much damage to the Presuppositionalists’ case as Malpass and others may think. One can provide various quotes from Van Til and Bahnsen to show that even they endorsed a modest TAG. So even if a modest TAG may not be the strongest possible presentation of TAG, it is still greatly sufficient for the apologist’s purposes.

Dr. Malpass then goes on to say that the presuppositionalist usually engages in a slip-and-switch between the two kinds of arguments. He claims that the Presuppositionalist defends a modest TAG but tries to claim an ambitious, metaphysical conclusion. But as I’ve pointed out above, this need not be the case. The apologist could self-consciously present a modest TAG without much difficulty. Pointing out the difference between the two kinds of arguments does not hurt the Presuppositionalist’s case at all. 

Furthermore, the Stroudian objection does not help the unbeliever at all. Pointing out that the Van Tilian has merely shown the epistemic necessity or Christian theism and not its actual truth does not help the unbeliever who’s worldview has been shown to be rationally indefensible. The unbeliever cannot even raise the Stroudian objection because his worldview has been shown to preclude such rational considerations. In essence, then, the Stroudian objection can only be raised from within the context of a Christian worldview. If this is the case, one is left wondering what the force of the objection is supposed to be. The objection is only forceful and devastating to someone who thinks an ambitious TAG is the only possible defense of Christian theism. But this is simply not the case.

But even though an ambitious TAG is not necessary for the Van Tilian’s case, an ambitious TAG is possible. This is still a largely underdeveloped area of study for Van Tilian thinkers, however the project has interesting prospects. For example, yours truly is currently developing one such argument. The general strategy for an ambitious TAG would be to demonstrate the internal incoherence of the negation of Christian theism. Such an argument would show not just that the unbelieving worldview is rationally self-defeating, but that it is self-falsifying. Showing such self-falsification would rely on the concept of truth and its reliance on a robustly Christian metaphysic.