Towards a Truly Van Tilian Use of Skeptical Scenarios

Presuppositionalists often appeal to skeptical scenarios in order to undermine unbelieving epistemological schemes. Typically, brain-in-vat or other similar scenarios are brought up. However, this particular approach is deeply flawed and I aim to show why. I’ll also present a more powerful alternative for Van Tilian thinkers.

Perception-based Skeptical Scenarios

“How do you know you’re not a brain in a vat?”


This is a popular frequently question asked by lay presuppositionalists. The question can be asked in various forms. In general, it takes the form: “how do you know skeptical scenario x does not obtain?” The idea here is that the inability of the unbeliever to rule out the possibility that he/she is a brain in a vat implies that he/she has no basis for knowledge. This is so because, the reasoning goes, if  they were a brain in a vat then they could be wrong about anything they claim to know. 


There are several problems with this strategy:


First, it places a certainty/infallibility condition on knowledge. The way the questions are usually asked, the kind of questions asked, the kind of scenarios posed, and the assumptions behind all these, impose a certainty condition on knowledge. Sometimes it is even directly presented (e.g. “how do you know for certain that…”). But such a condition on knowledge is without warrant. It is a very controversial epistemological position that is rarely defended by the presuppositionalists who use it. This has led many to claim that Van Tilians are ignorant of epistemology. The idea that to know x, one must be certain that x sets too high a standard for knowledge. It seems highly implausible that my grandma does not know she has hands simply because she does not know it with certainty. Furthermore, it is never specified what kind of certainty is being assumed (epistemic or psychological), neither is an appropriate analysis of the distinction between the two presented. This approach ends up being misguided at best, and intellectually lazy at worst.


Second, the mere possibility of error is not a rational basis for skepticism. This point is similar to the above point that certainty is not required for knowledge. The fact that I could be wrong does not provide a rational basis for me to doubt my beliefs. Acknowledging that one could be wrong is simply acknowledgement of human epistemic limitations. However, it is worth pointing out that some beliefs can be held infallibly. Acknowledgement of human fallibility should not be taken as an endorsement of fallibilism. To be fair, sometimes the question “could you be wrong about everything” is asked. This may seem to imply that the presuppositionalist is asking whether fallibilism or infallibilism is true. But this brings us to the next failure of this approach.


Third, it fails as a worldview critique. Even if it is granted that infallibilism is true (a point that presuppositionalists who take this approach never establish with argument), this does not in any way establish the epistemic necessity of Christian revelation. Presuppositionalists that use this approach never provide the argumentative support for the claim that the truth of infallibilism implies the necessity of Christian theism. Another reason it fails as a worldview critique is that it focuses on particular beliefs rather than entire epistemological systems. Ironically, this is the kind of thinking that Van Tilians critique classical apologists for! In asking “how do you know you’re not a brain in a vat”, the focus is on one’s justification for a particular belief. The problem is that analysis of particulars does not establish the failure of a system. The presuppositionalist in this case never makes the adequate logical connection between the failures of the unbeliever with respect to justifying particular beliefs and the failure of the unbeliever’s entire epistemology. 


More could be said, but this should suffice to show that using skeptical scenarios in this fashion does not help the Van Tilian’s case at all. But all hope is not lost. There is a more powerful way to deploy skeptical scenarios against unbelief. 


Metaphysical Skeptical Scenarios

The problem with using brain-in-vat and similar  scenarios to critique unbelief is that they do not prove what the Van Tilian wants to prove: namely, the epistemic necessity of the Christian worldview. This is because such scenarios merely indicate: a) a deception at the level of perception, b) the mere possibility of error. Taken together, these do not show that Christianity is necessary for knowledge to obtain. If I am a brain in a vat then my perceptions are illusory and I am wrong about all my beliefs. However, take Heraclitus’ flux for example, where everything is in a constant state of flux and the knower and the object of knowledge change so much there’s no sense in which one can say that S knows p. What makes it different from regular brain-in-vat scenarios? Couple of things:


Heraclitus’ flux is a metaphysical state-of-affairs that renders knowledge impossible. Regular brain-in-vat scenarios say nothing about the possibility of knowledge.


Failure to rule out regular brain-in-vat scenarios merely entails the possibility of error and a lack of certainty with respect to a given belief. However, failure of rule out Heraclitus’ flux entails the inability to know whether knowledge is possible. 


Here the Van Tilian has a more powerful way of undermining the non-Christian epistemological scheme. He can argue that all autonomous views fail to rule out metaphysical skeptical scenarios (which are infinite in number). This failure does not merely imply a lack of certainty, neither does it place infallibilist constraints on knowledge. Rather, this failure entails the lack of knowledge that knowledge is possible. He can then argue that the lack of this knowledge undermines the autonomous epistemology as a whole. And can also explain how only the Christian view can rule out such scenarios. 

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