Transcendental Argument and the Burden of Proof


Opponents of the presuppositional method of apologetics often criticize proponents of the method for not justifying their core claims with argument. It is claimed that presuppositionalists simply make unargued assertions and ask endless questions without ever giving arguments for their assertions. This claim is demonstrably false, as a cursory glance at the posts of this blog would show. However, there is a related idea amongst critics of the method. This is the idea that the burden of proof on the presuppositionalist’s shoulder is so great that one cannot even see how he could begin to meet it. The claim that Christian theism is the necessary precondition for intelligible human experience is said to be such a strong claim that the presupposutionalist would have to do serious philosophical heavy lifting in order to come close to justifying it. The presuppositionalist, it is said, would have to show that Christianity renders experience intelligible and that no other system can do the same.

In this post, I want to dispel that idea. I think that the burden of proof that the proponent of the transcendental argument shoulders is much lighter than people think. The reason for this is the nature of transcendental arguments themselves. I’ve expressed something similar in a previous post, but here I shall elaborate that point. 

The Modified Transcendental Argument for Christian Theism (mTACT)

Consider the following argument:

(1) If X is a sufficient condition for P but not a necessary condition for P, then there is a plurality of sufficient conditions for P.

(2) In the context of transcendental argumentation, there cannot be a plurality of sufficient conditions for the intelligibility of human experience.


(3) Therefore, in the context of transcendental argumentation, if a worldview W is a sufficient condition for the intelligibility of human experience, then W is also a necessary condition for the intelligibility of human experience.


(4) Christian Theism is a sufficient condition for the intelligibility of human experience.


(5) Therefore, Christian Theism is a necessary condition for the intelligibility of human experience.


(6) Human experience is intelligible.


(7) Therefore, Christian Theism is the case.

The above argument is a kind of modified Transcendental Argument for Christian Theism (TACT). Modified because the argument now involves two stages. Normally, only premises (5)-(7) would be presented as the TACT and the first premise (premise (5) in this instance) would be seen as the most controversial premise and the premise that allegedly grants the presuppositionalist an enormous burden of proof. However, here that premise is no longer controversial since it follows from previous premises in the first stage of the argument (premises (1)-(4)). The argument is valid. But how do the premises hold up under scrutiny? Premises (2) and (4) are the most controversial and that is where the proponent of this argument would need to shoulder his burden of proof. I believe this argument gives the presupppsirionalist a lighter burden of proof because I believe premises (2) and (4) are relatively easier to defend and I would get to them soon. But what about the other premises?

Premise (1) seems obviously true. A hammer blow to the head is a sufficient condition for killing someone but it is not a necessary condition because there is a plurality of sufficient conditions for killing someone. That is, there are other things and methods that do the job just as well. We don’t need to hit someone in the head with a hammer because there are other ways to get it done. However, humans need oxygen to survive because there is no other thing that does the job oxygen does. It is a necessary condition. Premise (3) follows from (1) and (2) via modus tollens. Premise (5) follows from (3) and (4), (6) is taken for granted due to the very nature of the apologetic discussion, and (7) follows from (5) and (6). 

Defending the Second Premise

How do we go about defending the second premise? In a post I wrote a few months ago titled “Sufficiency, Necessity, and Transcendental Arguments”, I briefly explain why a plurality of transcendentals (sufficient conditions for the intelligibility of human experience) is untenable. I said:


positing a plurality of sufficient worldviews leads to a problem of underdetermination. This means that incompatible and contradictory worldviews would have to be treated as equally valid with no way of choosing between them. Transcendental analysis is a means of adjudicating between competing worldviews but if we accept pluralism, then no such adjudication is possible. It leads us to the absurd conclusion that contradictory systems can both prove sufficient for our intelligible experience.


The above point can be made stronger. Basically, the point is that transcendental pluralism (a plurality of sufficient worldviews) leads to global underdetermination and complete skepticism. Why is this? Because transcendental pluralism would require us to accept that two (or more) contradictory systems are compatible with our intelligible experience. This state-of-affairs renders us incapable of knowing which world we live in (a Christian world or some other). It renders us incapable of knowing which worldview is true. And if this is the case, then knowledge and intelligible experience become impossible. Intelligible experience requires that we actually know the transcendental worldview (the worldview that provides the conditions for intelligible experience). If transcendental pluralism is the case, then reality becomes ultimately mysterious. And this contradicts the basic presupposition of transcendental argumentation—the intelligibility of human experience.


Greg Bahnsen, in one of his lectures, puts the point another way:


Similar to the first one, how do you know there isn’t another possible worldview out there that would work? The first answer to this is that in the nature of the case, there can only be one transcendental. There cannot be two “ultimate authorities”. Why? Because if there are two systems of truth you’ve then lost unity, coherence, continuity, and therefore intelligibility and truth. If you had two transcendentals you’d have to ask what the relationship is between the two systems. What unites the two (meaning, what makes sense of these two in the first place)?


In essence, the argument for why there cannot be a plurality of transcendentals is similar to the argument for why there cannot be a plurality of absolutes. A plurality of absolutes ends up destroying absoluteness altogether, resulting in relativism. Likewise, transcendental pluralism ends up in relativism, and relativism entails the destruction of intelligibility. 


Jimmy Stephens puts the point yet another way:


Against a plurality of sufficient conditions, you can remark that if there are multiple competing but sufficient conditions, then knowledge is underdetermined "all the way down," and so there are actually no sufficient conditions. Therefore, to preserve what had seemed to be multiple sufficient conditions, there must be some unifying explanation underlying the supposed set.

However, that is just to say there is one worldview or conceptual scheme, whatever, back of the diverse perspectives. That's not strictly multiple sufficient conditions at all! That's one sufficient condition with multiple subsets. It's not multiple sufficient worldviews; it's one worldview with very drastic denominations. Call this pluralism.

One will still need metaphysical knowledge of this pluralist metanarrative in order to preserve the denominations.


Defending the Fourth Premise

Defending premise (4) should be a walk in the park for any presuppositionalist familiar with Christian theology. All that is needed is to work through the different tenets and doctrines of Christianity and illustrate how they render human experience intelligible. This can be done on a case-by-case basis. 


Conclusion 

The mTACT is an interesting way to deploy the transcendental argument and should be further developed by Van Tilians. It makes the apologist’s case clearer and (in my opinion) more forceful. Not to mention, it makes the apologist’s job easier since all he really has to do to discharge his burden of proof is illustrate the sufficiency of Christianity and refute alternatives that may be presented. 

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